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5	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
6	WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON	
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8	YVONNE CACERES,	CASE NO. 3:14-CV-05908-DWC
9	Plaintiff,	ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
10	V. NANCY A DEDDVIII I Doputy	ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)
11	NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Deputy Commissioner of Social Security for Operations,	
12	Defendant.	
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14	Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Yvonne Caceres' Motion for Attorney's Fees	
15	Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Dkt. 32. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil	
16	Procedure 73 and Local Rule MJR 13, the parties have consented to have this matter heard by the	
17	undersigned Magistrate Judge. See Dkt. 19.	
18	Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), the Court may allow a reasonable fee for an attorney who	
19	represented a Social Security Title II claimant before the Court and obtained a favorable	
20	judgment, as long as such fee is not in excess of 25% of the total past-due benefits. See	
21	Grisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002). When a contingency agreement applies, the Court	
22	will look first to such agreement and will conduct an independent review to assure the	
23	reasonableness of the fee requested, taking into consideration the character of the representation	
24	and results achieved. See Grisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 80	07, 808. Although the fee agreement is the

1	primary means for determining the fee, the Court may reduce the fee for substandard	
2	representation, delay by the attorney, or because a windfall would result from the requested fee.	
3	See Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Grisbrecht, 535 U.S. at	
4	808).	
5	Here, Plaintiff signed a contingency fee agreement agreeing to pay her attorney a fee	
6	equal to 25% of the her past-due benefits. See Dkt. 32-3. The representation was not substandard	
7	and the results achieved were excellent. See Dkts. 24, 32-1; Grisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. This	
8	Court reversed and remanded this matter to the Administration for further proceedings and,	
9	following remand Plaintiff was awarded benefits. See Dkts. 24, 32-1. There is no evidence of an	
10	excessive delay by the attorney or that a windfall will result from the requested fee. Further,	
11	Defendant does not object to the requested fee. Dkt. 33.	
12	Plaintiff moves for attorney's fees in the amount of \$9,197.00, which is no more than	
13	25% of Plaintiff's total past-due benefits. See Dkts. 32, 32-1. Previously, Plaintiff was awarded	
14	an attorney fee of \$7,075.72 under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"). See Dkt. 31.	
15	Therefore, Plaintiff is moving for a net attorney's fee award of \$2,121.29. Based on Plaintiff's	
16	Motion and supporting documents (Dkts. 32, 32-1 – 32-3), and Defendant does not object to the	
17	requested fee (Dkt. 33), the Court orders attorney's fees in the amount of \$2,121.29, minus any	
18	applicable processing fees as allowed by statute, be awarded to Plaintiff's attorney pursuant to 42	
19	U.S.C. § 406(b). After paying the attorney's fee, the Social Security Administration shall release	
20	all remaining funds directly to Plaintiff.	
21	Dated this 6th day of June, 2018.	
22	Ma Minte	
23	David W. Christel	
24	United States Magistrate Judge	